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SUMMARY 
 
The dissertation investigates the causes and effects of partisan polarisation in European 
countries. Its aim is to create a method that can be used in comparative research, to explore 
which are the most polarized countries in contemporary Europe, and to investigate whether 
partisan polarisation has positive or negative effect on democratic and economic functioning. 
The dissertation measures partisan polarisation by comparing the political evaluations of the 
winning and losing political camps in all countries. The research uses European Social Survey 
(ESS) data supplemented with country level data. The main results are that heightened 
partisan polarisation is present in the majority of East-Central European and Southern 
European countries, and polarisation seems a thing to be worried about. Empirical results 
show that polarisation contributes to less democratic political and less successful economic 
functioning, while it enhances electoral turnout. Empirical tests show that ideological 
polarisation do not have the same detrimental effect as partisan polarisation, thus ideological 
dividedness is not as harmful for democratic and economic functioning as dividedness based 
on partisan bias is.  
 
1. MAIN CONCEPTS 
 
Polarisation is an often used, but many times poorly defined concept of public opinion and 
voting behaviour researchers, of which the causes and effects are highly debated. A 
considerable part of these contradictions may be caused by the fact that the term ‘political 
polarisation’ refers to a variety of things. Here I am interested in partisan polarisation of the 
electorate, instead of ideological or policy polarisation. I use the term ‘partisan polarisation’ 
to indicate the level of overall (not issue-specific) political dividedness in a country, meant as 
the relative distance between the political evaluations of governing and opposing parties’ 
voters. 
While partisanship and polarisation are two distinct concepts analytically, they are 
empirically closely related to each other, as both terms are widely used to describe animosity 
and dividedness across political lines. For example, describing the functioning of the 
polarised Hungarian political system, Palonen (2009) points that ‘parties or camps exist 
through their common opposition to one another, with a consequent normative-ideological 
logic: as you are the bad ones, we are the good ones’. This description is very similar to how 
Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes write about partisanship in the US: ‘the sense of partisan identity is 
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increasingly associated with a Manichean, ‘us against them’ view of the political world. 
Democrats and Republicans harbor generally negative feelings toward their opponents (…) 
there is sufficient animosity to make partisan affiliation relevant to inter-personal relations’ 
(Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012, p. 421). Based on this, we may declare a country to be 
strongly polarised in a partisan sense if its political scene is dominated by a ‘my party right 
or wrong’ (Klingemann & Wattenberg, 1992, p. 131) attitude, and if partisan attachments are 
an influential predictor of how voters evaluate political events. In a strongly polarised country 
partisanship ‘shapes the way citizens see the world of  politics  and  public  affairs’ to an 
extent that they practically ‘tend to see what they want to see’ (Gerber & Huber, 2009, p. 
423). To bring some empirical examples, recent analyses about the political polarisation of 
US’s voters show that Republicans and Democrats see the opposing party as more 
ideological, characterised by extreme ideological views, while consider their own party as 
more moderate. They tend to see the supporters of the other party as much more closed-
minded, dishonest, immoral, lazy and unintelligent than other Americans are, and the 
supporters of their own party as more open-minded, honest, etc. than other Americans are. 
Therefore, I assume that the roots of partisan polarisation lie mainly in affect and not in 
ideology as Iyengar et al. (2012) suggested. 
All in all, a high level of partisan polarisation in a country implies that its electorate’s 
political views are strongly biased based on their party preferences. In this paper I use the 
term ‘partisan polarisation’ to indicate the level of political dividedness in a country, while on 
the individual level, to indicate the level of polarization of subjects’ worldview I prefer to use 
the term ‘partisan bias’. It is important to note the difference between partisan polarization 
and ideological polarization: here I am not interested in ideological distance, or in the 
difference between two political sides in certain issues or policy aspects. Partisan polarisation 
is not strongly related to ideological stances or issues, but it indicates how different the 
political evaluations of the political sides are in general.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
 
The literature offers a wide range of hypotheses and explanations related to political 
polarisation, and almost every hypothesis made about polarisation has its contradictory 
counterpart. To put it simply, the main theoretical question of the research is whether 
polarisation promotes or inhibits healthy democratic and successful economic functioning. 
Many scholars claim that partisan attachments are useful for maintaining the political 
interest of voters; others argue that its opposite is true; as heightened partisan attitudes 
contribute strongly to voters’ disenchantment and to the decline of participation. This 
statement appears both on an individual and on an aggregated level: since the first empirical 
results of Lazarsfeld and his co-authors (1968) show that partisan voters are more likely to 
vote, and partisan polarisation in a society mobilises voters and enhances electoral turnout 
(Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). This way, the lack of partisan attitudes may be linked to the 
lack of interest toward politics in general, and to a moderate willingness not only to vote, but 
even to think, to speak, or to obtain information about politics. 
Another positive effect attributed to partisan loyalties is that they stabilise political 
opinions, therefore contribute to political stability, while the lack of strong partisan attitudes 
leads to high electoral volatility and less predictable political functioning (Klingemann & 
Wattenberg, 1992; Rose & Mishler, 1998a, p. 230; Tóka, 2005). The main argument of these 
scholars is that voting decisions made without partisan loyalties may be based exclusively on 
electoral pledges of parties and short-term calculations, and this could easily lead to the 
radical transformation of the party system after a less successful economic period or after a 
political scandal. This way, partisan loyalties – and more explicitly, partisan bias – toward 
political parties seem to be necessary for stable democratic functioning. 
Polarisation is also linked to a more responsive political behaviour and to a higher level of 
accountability. As Levendusky (2010) shows, elite polarisation makes voters’ opinions more 
consistent inside the political camps across different policy issues. This is advantageous from 
the viewpoint of accountability, because the opinion of political camps becomes easier to 
represent. This is in line with the results of Bafumi and Shapiro (2009) too. They found that 
during the last three decades ideological polarisation in the US coincided with the opinion 
polarisation of the Republican and Democrat electorates along many policy issues. Thus, 
voting decisions now are based (or to say the least, linked to) more on ideological and policy 
choices, while formerly they have been based mainly on partisan attachments. The results of 
Spoon and Klüver (2015) suggest the same. By analysing voters’ opinion polarisation they 
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found that more polarised electorates give clearer signals to their politicians about which 
positions are to be represented. Therefore, partisan polarisation contributes to responsiveness 
and accountability. 
While this part of the literature stresses the importance of strong partisan attachments in 
the political process, ‘polarisation sceptical’ scholars draw attention to the possible dangers of 
heightened partisan attitudes. As Iyengar and his co-authors (2012, p. 428) conclude their 
research stating that ‘the increased  level  of  affective  polarization  poses  considerable 
challenges to the democratic process’ (2012, p. 428).  
One of the possible negative aspects is that strong partisan dividedness contributes to 
adversarial politics which may lead to voters’ disillusionment and to the decline of electoral 
turnout (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2005). This may occur due to aggressive political 
advertising, to harsh negative campaigns – this kind of political communication is supposed to 
mobilise the most engaged part of the electorate but it is likely to intimidate less decided and 
less partisan voters (Ansolabehere et al., 1999). 
There is a general concern also regarding the quality of political debates and opinion 
formation. As Körösényi (2012, p. 301) describes, in a polarised context partisan camps see 
different political realities, and between these realities there may be a considerable gap, which 
does not offer a stable common ground to political debates. Angelusz and Tardos (2011, p. 
349) raise similar concerns about polarisation claiming that a ‘black-and-white simplification’ 
of debates between political platforms is a threat to democratic functioning as it deteriorates 
some basic principles of democratic debates and opinion formation. 
Polarisation can have a detrimental effect also on governmental effectiveness and on 
economic performance.  To cite Iyengar et al. (2012, p. 428) ‘Partisan bias in perceptions of 
economic conditions  means  that  voters  will  fail  to  credit  opposing-party  incumbents  
when the economy grows under their stewardship and fail to penalize in-party incumbents  
whose  economic  performance  is  suspect’. This view about the dangers of polarisation 
appears – among many others –  in the arguments of Körösényi (2013) and Tóka (2005, pp. 
21–22), who stress that these consequences of polarisation undermine accountability as they 
give few incentives to good governance. To use Iyengar and his co-authors’ words again, 
‘biased  beliefs  about  opposing elites—that they are duplicitous, self-interested, stupid, 
etc.—make it improbable that elites can persuade out-party partisans’ . (2012, p. 428). 
Lastly, following this argument, I turn to the question of legitimacy and democratic 
functioning. After an election in a strongly polarised context, opposing political camps may 
see the government as less legitimate. This favours political extremities or violent resistance 
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movements to be seen as legitimate tools against such an illegitimate government. Thus, the 
worst consequences of partisan polarisation are violent mass protests and civic wars (Iyengar 
et al., 2012, p. 428) 
To sum up, many scholars claim that partisan attachments are useful for maintaining the 
political interest of voters; but others argue that its opposite is true; as heightened partisan 
attitudes contribute strongly to voters’ disenchantment and to the decline of participation. 
Similarly, there is no consensus about its effect on the stability of the political system and on 
the governments’ performance. Scholars with a ‘polarisation optimistic’ attitude argue that 
polarisation has a stabilizing effect on the political system, because it mitigates the effect of 
less successful governmental programs, campaigns, or political scandals on voters’ party 
preferences.  
Others, instead, blame polarisation for destabilizing the political system, through the 
alternation of two poles with two markedly different sets of policies. Its effect on the quality 
of governance and on democratic functioning is also unclear and debated. Some political 
scientists point out that polarisation makes it easier to be responsive for politicians, by 
harmonizing policy preferences of voters of the same political camp. Others argue that it may 
reduce governmental accountability, because a deep division between political camps 
simplifies political debates to an us-or-them question, which does not motivate governments 
to a better performance.  
My hypothesis regarding democratic and economic functioning is in line with the views of 
some above-mentioned ‘polarisation sceptical’ scholars; I assume that polarisation is related 
to less democratic political and less effective economic functioning.  
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3. METHOD  
 
A common feature of methods that approach partisan feelings and attitudes in a society is to 
investigate only positive attitudes toward parties. However, there are some examples which 
clearly show how important considering negative feelings toward unpreferred parties is 
(Enyedi & Todosijević, 2009; Iyengar et al., 2012; Klingemann & Wattenberg, 1992; Rose & 
Mishler, 1998b). As the core of political polarisation is not only a positive bias towards one’s 
own party, but rather a combination of heightened negative feelings and evaluations toward 
the opposing political camp and heightened positive feelings and evaluations toward the own 
political camp, I measure political dividedness with the relative differences between the 
political opinions of the competing sides. By using the differences between the overall 
political evaluations of competing camps it can be shown how strong the partisan ‘perceptual 
screen’ is: how much are ‘rosier’ the evaluations of governing parties’ voters than the 
evaluations of opposition parties’ voters. 
Comparing (but even identifying) ‘political camps’ or political poles in different party 
systems which are composed of various numbers of parties of various size and ideological 
position is quite challenging. I propose to use parties’ winner-loser status to differentiate 
between political camps, classifying parties based on whether they were governing parties or 
opposition parties during the fieldwork period of surveys.  This way, the two created poles 
fundamentally reflect ‘who are with who’ on the political scene of the given country. 
Comparing the political evaluation of voters based on their winner-loser status is not a 
novelty, there is a growing body of literature that approaches the so called winner-loser gap 
(Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Blais & Gélineau, 2007; Brunell 
& Buchler, 2012; Craig, Martinez, Gainous, & Kane, 2006; Curini, Jou, & Memoli, 2012; 
Howell & Justwan, 2013; Singh, Karakoç, & Blais, 2012; Singh, Lago, & Blais, 2011). In 
contrast to this growing scholarly attention, it is interesting that the winner-loser gap has 
rarely been explicitly linked to partisan polarisation. Another option to make a distinction 
between political camps could be to use left-right scales, but the sense of left-right 
classification of parties across countries and political contexts is always questionable.  
Therefore, I propose to create winner-loser groups in each country, and to make an index 
by subjects’ answers about the satisfaction of different dimensions of the political system 
(including satisfaction with how democracy works, satisfaction with the national government, 
satisfaction with the economy and satisfaction with the educational and healthcare systems). I 
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decided to use all these variables about political satisfaction in order to offer a more complete 
picture about voters’ political evaluations, and to mitigate the effect of eventual country-
specific associations between certain variables.1  
Instead of using the differences between the mean evaluations of winners and losers I think 
it is better to divide the mean of winners’ ratings by the mean of losers’.2 Since I think this 
aspect to be very important, I prefer to use the relative difference (dividing winners’ 
evaluation by the evaluation of losers) instead of net differences.  
In order to avoid reverse ecological fallacy, making an index by adding more variables is 
only justified if they are positively correlated in each countries in all (or almost all) of the 
countries (Hofstede, 1984). The five variables of political satisfaction are positively correlated 
in the overwhelming majority of cases: we find a significant positive relationship (p<0.05) 
between them in 1197 cases of 1220.3 Based on this feature of the data I found it legitimate to 
make an index of the five variables. 
For this analysis I used the first six rounds of ESS data, excluding countries which are not 
parts of the EU or of the Schengen area. In order to make a clear distinction between 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’, I also excluded countries in those cases when fieldwork period 
overlapped with parliamentary elections and the cases when surveys were conducted after the 
parliamentary elections when the new government has not yet entered in office. In two cases I 
excluded the voters of those parties that left the government in fieldwork period. Neither do I 
include cases when the incumbent government was a technocratic one. All these exceptions 
are listed on Table 2 in the Appendix. The process finally resulted in 122 subjects on the level 
of countries (see Table 1 in the Appendix), relying on a database of more than 270 000 
individual subjects from 30 countries. Data about government composition, political 
institutional and economic variables have been borrowed from the Comparative Political Data 
Set project (Armingeon et al. 2013; 2015). 
 
                                                 
1 Instead of the index, another option could be to create a factor. To yield more easily interpretable results I 
decided to use the index. From a practical point of view, the index and the factor produce highly similar results, 
as there is a very high correlation between them (r=0.916; p<0.0001).  
 
2 To take an example, in 2012 the net difference between winners’ and losers’ ratings was 0.46 in Bulgaria and 
0.41 in Finland on a 0 to 10 scale, so the net difference between winners and losers differ little, based on these 
values the level of partisan polarisation in Bulgaria and in Finland is very similar. However, the averages of the 
evaluations in the two countries are 2.85 and 6.71 respectively, and this information puts the two countries’ level 
of partisan polarisation in a different perspective. 
 
3 The only case where there is a significant negative correlation between some variables is Slovakia in the 2nd 
ESS round, in 2005. 
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4. FINDINGS 
 
4.1. Descriptive findings about the level of partisan polarisation in European 
countries 
 
Apart from some interesting outlier results, when reviewing descriptive results of the new 
variable I found two striking characteristics. One of them is that the typical level of partisan 
polarisation is between 1.05 and 1.2. In the vast majority of countries (in 116 cases out of 
122) winners are more satisfied than losers are, but generally not to an exaggerated extent. 
ANOVA tests show that out of this 116 cases the difference between the two groups is 
significant in 108 cases, while in three cases I found a weak but significant negative 
relationship between political evaluations and winning position (in Finland, sample of 2003; 
Belgium, sample of 2007 and Slovenia, sample of 2009).  
The other important feature to be noted is the volatility of partisan polarisation within 
cases: however some countries’ results do not differ too much by ESS rounds, in other cases – 
like Hungary, Greece, Spain, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Poland, and the Czech Republic – 
there is considerable difference between them, despite of the relatively short time span. This 
feature shows that even if structural factors may explain one part of the variance of partisan 
polarisation, there is a considerable part of its variance that may be caused by non-structural 
factors, for example by an economic or political crisis, or by the changing of the dominant 
style of political communication in a country. 
Two countries certainly deserve attention for ‘outlier’ results. One is Slovenia in 2009 with 
its extremely negative winners’ ratings compared to the losing camp; the other is Hungary in 
2007, where polarisation is by far the strongest in the analysed period. Such an extreme level 
of partisan polarisation is surprising, even if scholars recurrently report very strong partisan 
feelings in Hungarian society (Körösényi, 2013; Palonen, 2009; Tardos & Angelusz, 2009; 
Tóka, 2005), in contrast to feeling-close-to-a-party–type questions, which show a moderate or 
even low level of partisan feelings. These interesting cases are worthwhile to be studied in 
future works. 
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To sum up, the methodological aim of the dissertation was to create a measurement 
method of partisan polarisation, which is adequate for comparative research. It is designed to 
show how strong the partisan ‘perceptual screen’ is in a country. Across the differences 
between the overall political evaluations of the competing camps it measures how much 
‘rosier’ are the evaluations of governing parties’ voters than that of opposition parties’ voters. 
The research showed that the most polarised countries in Europe are mainly the Eastern and 
Southern European ones, like Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Cyprus. 
 
4.2. Individual-level findings - testing the method 
 
First I investigated the reasons of partisan polarisation on the individual level. Based on the 
findings of the relevant literature I examined the possible influence of age, gender, ideological 
views, being politically well-informed and level of education. The analysis confirmed the 
correlations longest known in the literature of partisanship, which have since been supported 
by former works. With the newly-created methods, testing the questions with several models, 
I have found consistent results universal for all methods and models regarding age and 
interest in politics increasing political bias. The findings of the chapter are consistent with the 
most robust earlier findings regarding partisanship. The influence of political ideological 
views, however, - contradicting the assumptions and findings of the literature, which 
connected right-wing-conservative views to stronger bias – showed no clear pattern across 
European countries.  
Similarly, neither being politically well-informed and more educated have a clear effect on 
the level of bias. The level of bias is positively correlated with both education and being well-
informed, however, the influence of these factors disappears in multiple regression analysis. 
Moreover, in some models the effect turns into a significant negative one. Interestingly, this 
negative relationship is just what is found on an aggregated level: in countries with higher 
levels of education, political interest, and higher average levels of political awareness, the 
level of partisan polarisation is more moderate. These findings offer some room for optimism 
contradicting the conclusions of a relatively new body of literature arguing that democratic 
functioning can not be improved across informing voters and raising the level of education 
(Achen & Bartels, 2016; Shani, 2006). As opposed to this concerns, my findings show that 
although those with higher levels of interest, education and knowledge were indeed more 
biased than less educated and politically less aware voters were, in itself neither being 
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informed nor the level of education increased bias. The main factor instead is political 
interest, which absorbs the effect of awareness and education levels. 
This chapter’s findings may be the least surprising, but they are still important, as individual 
level analysis confirmed the longest known correlations of partisanship literature. This way, 
they underpin the adequacy of the methodological innovation. In line with findings of public 
opinion research, I found that partisan bias increases with age and being more interested in 
politics. These results show that the method used here and traditional methods of measuring 
partisanship detect similar social phenomena.  
 
4.3. Country-level findings - what increases polarisation? 
 
In chapter 8, I investigated the role that political and economic features might have on the 
level of partisan polarisation. That is, what makes a country’s political community polarised? 
My hypotheses were that majoritarian democracies are more polarised in a partisan sense than 
consensual ones are; poorer countries are more polarised than wealthier ones; a worse 
economic performance leads to higher levels of polarisation; less democratic countries are 
more polarised than more democratic ones are; ideologically polarised ones are polarised in a 
partisan sense also, and where (in a sense measured by conventional measurement methods) 
voters are more partisan or ideologically more divided, partisan polarisation is also stronger. 
According to the findings, majoritarian democracies are indeed more strongly polarised in 
a partisan sense. Among the institutional features I examined, low level of fractionalization 
clearly increases polarisation, that is, if political competition involves only few relevant 
parties. This result definitely contradicts to the assumption of Downs (1957) who theorized a 
reversed relationship between political polarisation and bipartisan competition. He supposed 
that bipartisan competition makes it unlikely that political camps become polarised. 
A reversed link between partisan polarisation and the quality of democratic functioning is 
also clear, as poorly-performing democracies are obviously more polarised. On the other 
hand, economic development and the ideological polarisation of voters have no significant 
effect. Thus, contradicting to a relevant part of the theoretical literature, all other features held 
constant, ideological polarisation measured on a left-right scale does not have an effect on the 
level of partisan polarisation. 
The effect of economic growth, however, is significant in all models and it is negative, 
therefore, the effect of a downturn clearly polarises the opinions of the competing political 
camps. 
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4.4. Country-level findings – the effect of polarisation on political and economic 
functioning 
 
In the last two chapters of my dissertation I examine the effects of partisan polarisation. My 
main hypothesis was that the effect of partisan polarisation is harmful for both political and 
economic functioning, contributing to poorer democratic functioning and weaker economic 
results. The analysis supports both hypotheses. 
Having in mind also the findings about the reasons of polarisation, it seems that the quality 
of democracy and partisan polarisation are strongly interrelated, forming a vicious circle: 
worse democratic functioning might cause polarisation, and strong partisan divisions may 
lead to weaker democratic functioning. On the other hand, polarisation has an effect on 
democratic functioning that can be evaluated positively from a normative point of view: 
presumably, across raising the level of interest in politics, it contributes to higher levels of 
electoral turnout even when controlling for several other factors. To sum up, when discussing 
the possible positive and negative effects of polarisation on democratic functioning, my 
findings clearly support the viewpoint of the ‘sceptical side’. However, more optimistic views 
about the role of polarisation are right when pointing to its role in maintaining interest in 
politics and fostering participation. 
Findings regarding economic functioning, if possible, are even clearer: having analysed the 
causes and effects I have found that partisan polarisation is clearly related to worse economic 
results in all dimensions of economic performance I examined. In multi-variable models 
polarisation had a significant effect on both economic growth and unemployment rate even 
controlling for several other important variables. 
Besides the role of partisan bias, an alternative hypothesis could be that huge differences 
between the evaluations of electorates/political camps stem from sharply different views 
about the definition of good functioning, as the findings presented here would fit also in the 
framework of other theories, which stress the possible role of ideological dividedness. 
According to Downs (and many others since then), strong ideological polarisation may result 
in ineffective governing, as with the alternation of governments policy measures continuously 
waver between the two extremes (1990, pp. 1003–1004). This way, democracy is effective 
only when the distribution of political ideologies is close to a normal distribution. Anyhow, 
this reasoning is not what I follow in my dissertation, as in multi-variate analyses ideological 
polarisation did not explain the variance of partisan polarisation significantly in any of the 
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cases. This implies that the extent of the ideological/policy differences in voters’ preferences 
is of secondary importance in the formation of partisan polarisation. These findings give 
support to the assumption of the dissertation, which suggests that large differences in 
satisfaction between political camps can be considered as signs of bias rather than signs of 
deep ideological dividedness. 
Moreover, the effect of partisan polarisation on both political and economic functioning is 
significant even if we control for ideological dividedness. Contradicting the arguments of 
Downs – if we accept the left-right scale as an appropriate tool for grasping the distinctions 
between ideological views in European societies – voters having different ideas about what a 
well-functioning state or economy is like does not hinder economic growth. What hinders 
economic growth is when a country’s electorates have a strong political bias, that is, if 
electorates’ evaluations regarding the current situation are significantly different. Although it 
is a widely shared view in the literature that a moderate level of partisan bias has several 
positive effects, and only extremely partisan attitudes are harmful, the analysis do not confirm 
such a link either between partisan polarisation and democratic functioning or between 
partisan polarisation and economic functioning. Therefore, contradicting to theories about the 
positive effects of partisan bias, this dissertation’s results imply that the smaller the partisan 
bias/polarisation is in a country, the better. 
To sum up, the empirical analyses provided a clear answer to the main theoretical question 
of my dissertation – what effect partisan polarisation has on democratic and economic 
functioning – heightened partisan polarisation seems to have a harmful effect on both political 
and economic functioning, while it also has one effect conducive to good democratic 
functioning: increasing participation. Thus, these results support the views of ‘polarisation 
optimistic’ researchers regarding the role of partisan polarisation in mobilizing voters, while 
they underpin the views of ‘polarisation sceptics’ with regards to the reversed links between 
the level of polarization and both democratic and economic performance. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Countries included in the analysis by ESS round 
 
  2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Austria * * * 
   Belgium * * * * * * 
Bulgaria 
  
* * * * 
Czech Republic * * 
  
* * 
Croatia 
   
* 
  Cyprus 
  
* * 
 
* 
Denmark * * * * * * 
Estonia 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
Finland * * * * * * 
France * * * * * * 
Germany 
 
* * * * * 
Greece * * 
  
* 
 Hungary * * * * * * 
Italy * 
     Iceland 
 
* 
   
* 
Ireland * * 
 
* * * 
Latvia 
   
* 
  Lithuania 
    
* * 
Luxembourg * * 
    Netherlands * * 
 
* 
  Norway * * * * * * 
Poland * * * * * * 
Portugal * 
 
* * * * 
Romania 
   
* 
  Slovakia 
 
* * * * * 
Slovenia * 
 
* * * * 
Spain * * * * * * 
Sweden 
 
* * * * * 
Switzerland * * * * * * 
United Kingdom * * * * * * 
 
Table 2. Countries which are present in ESS’s integrated data sets but have been excluded 
from the analysis. 
 
 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Parliamentary elections 
during fieldwork period 
Germany, 
Sweden 
Italy, 
Portugal 
Estonia, 
Ireland, 
Netherlands 
Greece 
Croatia, 
Cyprus, 
Estonia 
Netherlands 
Parliamentary elections 
prior to the fieldwork  
period, new government 
not yet entered in office  
 
Slovenia 
  
Netherlands 
 
Voters of parties who left 
the government during 
fieldwork period 
LPF voters 
(Netherlands)    
NC voters 
(France)  
Technocratic government 
in office    
Czech 
Republic   
Countries excluded from 
the analysis 
Albania, Kosovo, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Israel 
Number of countries in the 
sample 
18 21 18 23 20 22 
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